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INSURANCE-SEL-INSURER NOT LIABLE FOR INJURIES SUS-
TAINED THROUGH THE NEGLIGENCE OF A PERMISSIVE USER NOT
OPERATING THE VEHICLE. Glens Falls Insurance Co. v. Con-
solidated Freightways (Cal. App. 1966).
While helping load concrete beams onto his truck, Pratt, a driver
for Consolidated Freightways, was struck on the head by a steel
hook suspended from a forklift. The forklift was being used in the
loading process and was owned by Basalt Rock Company and oper-
ated by its employee, Jorden. Pratt brought suit for his injuries
against Jorden and Basalt. Basalt's insurer, Glens Falls Insurance
Company, settled the claim, and thereafter brought action against
Consolidated Freightways, a self-insurer, for a declaration of rights
and duties under the respective insurance coverage of the parties.
Glens Falls contended that Jorden, the forklift operator, was an
"additional insured" to be covered by Consolidated's self-insurance.
The superior court granted defendant's motion for a summary judg-
ment. On appeal to the District Court of Appeal, held, affirmed:
The California Vehicle Code does not impose liability upon a self-
insurer for injuries caused by a permissive user of the motor vehicle
who is not operating the vehicle at the time of the injury. Glens
Falls Insurance Co. v. Consolidated Freightways, 242 Adv. Cal. App.
912, 51 Cal. Rptr. 789 (1966), petition for hearing denied, August
22, 1966.
The California Automobile Financial Responsbility Laws,' through
the permissive use statute,2 extend coverage under a motor vehicle
liability policy to include permissive users of a motor vehicle. Even
where a liability policy does not contain a provision that a use of
the vehicle includes loading and unloading, a person acting in that
capacity has been judicially determined to be using the vehicle and
has been held an additional insured under the policy.3 Further, the
1 CAL. VEHICLE CODE §§ 16000-16503.
2 CAL. VEHICLE CODE § 16451.
An owner's policy of liability insurance shall:
(b) Insure the person named therein and any other person, as insured, using
any owned motor vehicle with the express or implied permission of said
assured, against loss from the liability imposed by law for damages arising
out of ownership, maintenance, or use of such motor vehicle ....
3 United States Steel Corp. v. Transport Indem. Co., 241 Adv. Cal. App. 554,
558-59, 50 Cal. Rptr. 576, 579 (1966) ; General Pump Serv., Inc. v. Travelers Ins. Co.,
238 Cal. App. 2d 81, 86-87, 47 Cal. Rptr. 533, 537 (1965); Campidonica v. Transport
Indem. Co., 217 Cal. App. 2d 403, 406-07, 31 Cal. Rptr. 735, 738 (1963); Industrial
Indem. Co. v. General Ins. Co. of America, 210 Cal. App. 2d 352, 357, 26 Cal. Rptr.
568, 571 (1962).
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terms of the permissive use statute become implied covenants, by
operation of law, of every motor vehicle liability policy issued in
California.4
Glens Falls contended that the permissive use statute should pro-
vide a similar extended coverage to Consolidated as a self-insurer.
In rejecting this contention, the Consolidated court held that the
permissive use statute applies only to the provisions of a motor
vehicle liability policy and not to the terms of a certificate of self-
insurance.5 Furthermore, liability of a self-insurer may be imposed
only by virtue of the imputed negligence statute, and even then only
with respect to injuries arising out of the operation, rather than the
use, of a motor vehicle.
7
The liability imposed upon a motor vehicle owner by the imputed
negligence statute extends his basis of liability beyond the common-
law agency principles to include those situations where the doctrine
of respondeat superior is not applicable.8 This result occurs because
the basis of an owner's liability is the permission, express or implied,
given by the owner to another to operate his vehicle.9 The permissive
use statute, on the other hand, merely prescribes the necessary cover-
age terms of a motor vehicle liability policy and does not create an
independent basis of liability different from that of a self-insurer.10
However, the permissive use statute does impose responsibility upon
an insurer to pay for damages beyond those required to be paid by
4 Interinsurance Exch. Co. of America v. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co., 58 Cal. 2d 142, 146,
373 P.2d 640, 643, 23 Cal. Rptr. 592, 595 (1962); Wildman v. Government Em-
ployees' Ins. Co., 48 Cal. 2d 31, 39, 307 P.2d 359, 364 (1957) ("We are of the
opinion that for an insurer to issue a policy of insurance which does not cover an
accident which occurs when a person, other than the insured, is driving . . . is a
violation of the public policy of this state as set forth in sections 402 and 415 [now
sections 17150 and 16451] of the Vehicle Code."); Bohrn v. State Farm Mut. Auto.
Ins. Co., 226 Cal. App. 2d 497, 504, 38 Cal. Rptr. 77, 81 (1964); Campidonica v.
Transport Indem. Co., 217 Cal. App. 2d 403, 406, 31 Cal. Rptr. 735, 737 (1963).
5 Glens Falls Ins. Co. v. Consolidated Freightways, 242 Adv. Cal. App. 912, 923-
24, 51 Cal. Rptr. 789, 796-97 (1966).
6 CAL. VEHICLE CODE § 17150.
Every owner of a motor vehicle is liable and responsible for the death of or
injury to person or property resulting from negligence in the operation of the
motor vehicle, in the business of the owner or otherwise, by any person using
or operating the same with the permission, express or implied, of the owner,
and the negligence of such person shall be imputed to the owner ....
7" 242 Adv. Cal. App. at 924, 51 Cal. Rptr. at 795.
8 Peterson v. Grieger, Inc., 57 Cal. 2d 43, 50, 367 P.2d 420, 424, 17 Cal. Rptr.
828, 832 (1961) ; Burgess v. Cahill, 26 Cal. 2d 320, 323, 158 P.2d 393, 394 (1945);
Rosenthal v. Harris Motor Co., 118 Cal. App. 2d 403, 405, 257 P.2d 1034, 1035
(1953).
9 Scollan v. Government Emp. Ins. Co., 222 Cal. App. 2d 181, 35 Cal. Rptr. 40
(1963) ; see statute cited note 6 supra.
10 242 Adv. Cal. App. at 921, 51 Cal. Rptr. at 795.
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a self-insurer or anyone else not covered by a liability policy, i.e.,
the additional damages incurred in loading and unloading accidents.
This additional coverage is made possible by the inclusion of the
word "use" in the permissive use statute."
The term "use" is one of extension in that an injury arising out
of the use of a motor vehicle need not be a direct and proximate
result of the active movement of the vehicle, whereas operation con-
templates the active movement of the vehicle. Thus, the loading and
unloading of a motor vehicle is termed a use of the vehicle, rather
than an operation, 2 even though there is little, if any, activity or
movement of the vehicle itself.' 3 The permissive use statute has
accordingly been interpreted to bring within the coverage of an
insurance policy any injuries sustained in loading and unloading
accidents. 4 The conclusion reached has not varied when the actual
cause of the injury was an independent instrumentality used to help
in the process of loading and unloading. 5 However, since the im-
puted negligence statute, as applied to motor vehicle owners, covers
only injuries resulting from the operation of a vehicle, the self-insurer
will not be liable for injuries caused by a third person, non-operator
of the vehicle, acting as a permissive user of the vehicle for loading
and unloading purposes.' 6
The decision in Consolidated supports the criticism that the Finan-
cial Responsibility Laws lack definite uniformity when applied to
the self-insurer as opposed to one who holds a motor vehicle liability
policy. The lack of uniformity is apparent when one considers that
had Consolidated been an insurance carrier, rather than a self-insurer,
11 See statute cited note 2 supra.
12 242 Adv. Cal. App. at 924-25, 51 Cal. Rptr. at 797. Perhaps the leading case
outside of California holding that loading and unloading is a use of a vehicle within
the omnibus provisions of a liability policy is Wagman v. American Fid. & Cas. Co.,
304 N.Y. 490, 109 N.E.2d 592 (1952). For discussions of loading and unloading
as a use covered by omnibus insurance clauses, see 47 CORNELL L.Q. 469 (1962);
31 FoRD-Am L. REV. 178 (1962); 13 SYRACUSE L. REV. 573 (1962).
13 Colby v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 220 Cal. App. 2d 38, 43, 33 Cal. Rptr. 538, 541
(1963); American Auto. Ins. Co. v. American Fid. & Cas. Co., 106 Cal. App. 2d
630, 635, 235 P.2d 645, 647-48 (1951).
14 E.g., General Pump Serv., Inc. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 238 Cal. App. 2d 81, 47
Cal. Rptr. 533 (1965); Campidonica v. Transport Indem. Co., 217 Cal. App. 2d
403, 31 Cal. Rptr. 735 (1963); Industrial Indem. Co. v. General Ins. Co. of
America, 210 Cal App. 2d 352, 26 Cal. Rptr. 568 (1962); Pleasant Valley Ass'n v.
Cal-Farm Ins. Co., 142 Cal. App. 2d 126, 298 P.2d 109 (1956).
1r E.g., Industrial Indem. Co. v. General Ins. Co. of America, supra note 14
(crane); Pleasant Valley Ass'n v. Cal-Farm Ins. Co., supra note 14 (truck-tilting
platform).
10 242 Adv. Cal. App. 912, 51 Cal. Rptr. 789.
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the provisions of the permissive use statute would have imposed upon
Consolidated responsibility for the injuries caused by the forklift
operator during the loading of Consolidated's truck.
Conceding the fact that the imputed negligence statute is not a
part of the Financial Responsibility Laws,'17 it nevertheless remains
the only statute available to impute negligence to self-insurers. It
thus has a direct effect upon the application of the provisions of the
Financial Responsibility Laws. A more liberal reading of the imputed
negligence statute by the Consolidated court would have lent itself
toward achieving uniformity of financial responsibility for the insur-
ance carrier and the self-insurer. Such uniformity, if achieved, would
seemingly have given full credence to the legislative intent behind
the Financial Responsibility Laws, namely, to protect innocent third
persons from the careless use of automobiles and to place this pro-
tection paramount to the rights of an owner who permits the use
of his vehicle by others.' 8
A liberal reading of the imputed negligence statute seems plausible
since the statute utilizes the word "operation" conjunctively with the
word "use."' 9 It would appear more appropriate for the Consolidated
court to have read the statute as imputing negligence to a motor
vehicle owner for injuries caused "by any person using or operating
the same with the permission .. .of the owner." Although both
terms are present in the statute, the Consolidated court did not dis-
cuss the inclusion of the term "use," instead relegating its discussion
to the term "operate."
Relying upon the language used by the California Supreme Court
in Sutton v. Tanger,20 it would appear that the term "use" is an
integral part of the imputed negligen&e statute. In quoting from
Feitelberg v. Matuson,2' the Sutton court questioned:
What was the purpose of adding the word "use" unless it was
meant to include the person who had the actual, though not
17 The imputed negligence statute, § 17150, is in Division 9 of the California
Vehicle Code under "Civil Liability;" the permissive use statute, § 16451, is found
in Division 7 under "Financial Responsibility Laws."
18 Jurd v. Pacific Indem. Co., 57 Cal. 2d 699, 371 P.2d 569, 21 Cal. Rptr. 793
(1962) ; Burgess v. Cahill, 26 Cal. 2d 320, 158 P.2d 393 (1945); Souza v. Corti,
22 Cal. 2d 454, 139 P.2d 645 (1943); Rosenthal v. Harris Motor Co., 118 Cal. App.
2d 403, 257 P.2d 1034 (1953).
19 See statute cited note 6 supra.
20 115 Cal. App. 267, 270, 1 P.2d 521, 523 (1931) ("The code section makes
the owner liable for the negligence of any person using or operating his automobile
with his implied or express permission."). (Emphasis added.)
21 124 Misc. 595, 208 N.Y. Supp. 786 (1925).
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physical control of the car .... If the liability of the owner were
limited to the acts of the operator, the statute would become a dead
letter in most cases. Its evasion would be an easy matter. The statute
must be interpreted in harmony with its verbiage. We cannot hold
that "using" and "operating" are interchangeable or synonymous
words. If the owner choses to intrust his car to another person,
he invests such person, so long as he uses the car, with the same
authority in regard to the management of the car which the owner
has. . . The statute so provides in unmistakable language.
22
(Emphasis added.)
Had the Sutton and Feitelberg analyses prevailed in Consolidated,
it is submitted that the defendant self-insurer would have been found
liable for the injuries inflicted by the forklift operator. This result
would seem consistent since the imputed negligence statute incor-
porates the term "use," which term in itself includes loading and
unloading.
23
The California Vehicle Code provides four methods for meeting
the requirements of financial responsibility, thereby exempting one
from the sanctions24 of the Financial Responsibility Laws: (1) a
motor vehicle liability policy; 25 (2) a certificate of self-insurance;2 6
(3) a surety company bond;27 and (4) a deposit of $25,000 with
the Department of Motor Vehicles.2 In view of the four possible
alternatives, is the Consolidated decision necessarily limited in appli-
cation to only those situations involving a self-insurer? Would it not
be more correct to say that the applicability of Consolidated extends
22 115 Cal. App. at 270-71, 1 P.2d at 523.
23 See cases cited note 3 supra. A more probable result would be equal contribution
between the parties, provided neither has insurance that is considered "excess." See,
e.g., Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Maryland Cas. Co., 65 Adv. Cal. 339, 419 Adv.
Pac. 641, 54 Adv. Cal. Rptr. 385 (1966).
24 E.g., CAL. VEHICLE CODE § 16080 (suspension of driving license); CAL.
VEHICLE CODE § 16100 (suspension of automobile registration card); for other sanc-
tions see §§ 16101-16377.
25 CAL. VEHICLE CODE § 16431.
26 CAL. VEHICLE CODE § 16436.
Proof of ability to respond to damages may be given by the written certificate
of a self-insurer holding a certificate of self-insurance for bodily injury and
property damage issued by the department....
See also CAL. VEHICLE CODE § 16055.
Exemption may be established if the owner of the motor vehicle involved
in the accident was a self-insurer. Any person in whose name more than 25
motor vehicles are registered may qualify as a self-insurer by obtaining a
certificate of self-insurance issued by the department ....
There are at present sixty-four self-insurance certificates in force in California. Letter
from Robert K. Miller, California Driver Improvement Analyst, to the San Diego Law
Review, October 18, 1966, on file in the University of San Diego Law Library.
27 CAL. VEHICLE CODE § 16434.
28 CAL. VEHICLE CODE § 16435.
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to any person not covered by a motor vehicle liability policy? Pre-
sumably the latter application would be more reasonable, since the
Permissive use statute applies only to liability policy terms.
The problem is not that there will be unprotected innocent third
persons injured by loading and unloading accidents;2 9 the problem
lies in the fact that the Financial Responsibilty Laws, due to the
holding in Consolidated, do not provide an equal basis of responsi-
bility for exemption from the sanctions. The liability policy holder
must provide financial security for loading and unloading accidents,
whereas the self-insurer does not have this responsibility, apart from
any agency situations that may arise. Perhaps an explanation of this
result lies in the fact that the court is giving credence to the prevail-
ing attitude that an insurance company can best absorb the loss since
it can spread the costs among its policy holders.80 Had the holding
in Consolidated been consonant with the ruling in Sutton v. Tanger,
the discrepancy would have been avoided, thus insuring the public
of a uniform basis of recovery from the liability policy holder, the
self-insurer, the bond holder, and the person depositing $25,000 with
the Department of Motor Vehicles.
The discrepancy resulting from the Consolidated decision could
also be eliminated by legislative amendments to the statute autho-
rizing the issuance of a certificate of self-insurance as a method of
meeting the requirements of financial responsibility3l and to the
imputed negligende statute3 2 Similar statutes enacted in states other
than California could serve as guides for the proposed legislation.
For example, the New York statute which authorizes a certificate of
self-insurance as one method of meeting the requirements of finan-
cial responsibility provides that the certificate shall be issued only
when the person requesting it has twenty-five or more vehicles regis-
tered in his name and has proven his financial ability to respond to
damages arising out of the use or operation of his motor vehicles.8
20 It will be noted that in Consolidated, Glens Falls paid the damages of the truck
driver. 242 Adv. Cal. App. at 915, 51 Cal. Rptr. at 791.
80 See generally, PROSSER, TORTS §§ 83-86 (3d ed. 1964).
81 See statute cited note 26 supra.
32 See statute cited note 6 supra.
33 N.Y. VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC LAW § 316.
The commissioner, in his discretion, may upon the application of a person
having registered in this state more than twenty-five motor vehicles, issue a
certificate of self-insurance when he is reasonably satisfied that such person
is possessed and will continue to be possessed of financial ability to respond
to judgments obtained against such person, arising out of the ownership,




By thus making the owner liable for injuries arising out of the use,
as well as the operation of his vehicles, the self-insurer is made sub-
ject to the same degree of responsibility accorded a person holding
a liability policy. A similar amendment to the California statutes
authorizing the deposit of $25,000 and the posting of a surety bond
to include responsibility for all injuries arising out of the use of their
vehicles would also be appropriate. New York's imputed negligen~e
statute might also serve as a useful guide for amending the California
imputed negligence statute, since the former statute employs the
phrase "operation or use" consistently throughout.
34
Through such legislative enactments, the California Financial
Responsibility Laws could achieve uniformity in the application of
financial responsibility to vehicle owners. These amendments would
invoke the legislative intent of providing for the paramount interests
of injured third persons over and above the interests of motor vehicle
owners who allow their vehicles to be used by others.
Louis C. NovAK
Accord, MICH. COMP. LAws § 256.253(a) (1948); compare CAL. VEHICLE CODE §
16436 with ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 951/2, § 7-502 (1965), OHIO REV. CODE ch. 4509 §
4509.72 (1964), and WAsH. REv. CODE ch. 46.29 § 46.29.630 (1965 Supp.); see
also, TEx. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6701h (1960), Sec. 18.
Proof of financial responsibility when required under this Act with respect to
a motor vehicle or with respect to a person who is not the owner of a motor
vehicle may be given by filing:
4. A certificate of self-insurance... supplemented by an agreement by the
self-insurer that, with respect to accidents occurring while the certificate is in
force, he will pay the same judgments and in the same amounts that an in-
surer would have been obligated to pay under an owner's motor vehicle lia-
bilty policy if it had issued such a policy to said self-insurer.
34 N.Y. VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC LAW § 388.
1. Every owner of a vehicle used or operated in this state shall be liable and
responsible for death or injuries to person or property resulting from negli-
gence in the use or operation of such vehicle, in the business of such owner
or otherwise, by any person using or operating the same with the permission,
express or implied, of such owner.... (Emphasis added.)
If the phrase "operation or use" had been employed consistently in the California im-
puted negligence statute, as in the New York statute, Consolidated Freightways would
probably have been found financially responsible for the loading injuries sustained by
its driver by the forklift operator. See Stole v. United States Steel Corp., 34 Misc. 2d
103, 227 N.Y.S.2d 595 (1962).
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